Journal of Legislation
Volume 46

Issue 2

Article 4

7-22-2020

The Relationship Between the Bill of Attainder Clause, The Use of
Sanctions as a Regulatory Tool for Foreign Trade, and Corporate
Personhood
Alina Veneziano

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Part of the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Alina Veneziano, The Relationship Between the Bill of Attainder Clause, The Use of Sanctions as a
Regulatory Tool for Foreign Trade, and Corporate Personhood, 46 J. Legis. 276 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol46/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Legislation by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BILL OF
ATTAINDER CLAUSE, THE USE OF SANCTIONS AS A
REGULATORY TOOL FOR FOREIGN TRADE, AND
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
Alina Veneziano*
The Chinese-based telecommunications giant, Huawei Technologies, has sued the
U.S. government contending that the sanctions imposed upon it via legislation violate
the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Even though a district court has
recently denied Huawei’s motion for summary judgment, this case presents an
interesting question and under-examined issue as to whether the Bill of Attainder
Clause applies to corporations in the first place. The Supreme Court has never
affirmatively stated whether corporations can sue under the Clause. Lower courts
have assumed that it does apply, though some have ruled against the corporate
plaintiff on other grounds. With the exception of the Second Circuit, no other court
decision has found a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate
entity. This article departs from prior case law and scholarship by urging against the
extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause to the corporate entity and is the first to
present sustained arguments based on history, Supreme Court language, defamation
law, state and federal regulatory powers, and foreign affairs to show that the Clause
ought not be extended in this respect. While acknowledging that the Second Circuit
has found a violation of the Clause in favor of the corporate entity, this article criticizes
the Second Circuit’s holding as flawed and incomplete. Specifically, this article
argues primarily that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects only personal dignitary
interests. First, it discusses that the history of the Clause indicates an individual-rights
standpoint. Second, it illuminates how all Supreme Court opinions that have found a
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause have dealt with the natural person—either
individually or as a part of an ascertainable group. Third, even though corporations
can sue for defamation, it argues that corporations cannot be analogized to individuals
in this manner because the only cognizable injury a corporation can sustain is injury
to its business and economic interests. Fourth, it asserts that because the corporation
is subject to both state and federal regulation by virtue of incorporation, it surrenders
some of its privacy. This article secondarily argues that corporate extension of the
Bill of Attainder Clause will impede national security interests and foreign policy in
three respects: by interfering with Congress’ ability to (1) sanction properly, (2)
regulate foreign trade, and (3) respond swiftly to foreign policy issues such as threats
to U.S. intelligence and cybersecurity. Thus, as will be demonstrated, the Bill of
Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution cannot be maintained by corporations
because it only protects the personal dignitary interest of individuals and cannot be
maintained due to Congress’ interests in preventing interference with foreign
relations.
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I. PRESENTING THE HUAWEI CASE AND U.S. BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE
A. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the relationship between the Bill of Attainder Clause in the
U.S. Constitution,1 legislative sanctions, and corporate personhood for bill of attainder
claims.2 It is written in light of the recent sanctions imposed by the 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) against Huawei Technologies and the
subsequent lawsuit filed by Huawei against the U.S. government. Huawei’s lawsuit
alleged that certain provisions of the NDAA constitute a violation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause. In February 2020, a district court judge denied Huawei's motion for
summary judgment and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment.3
This Article discusses the very interesting and unsettled issue as to whether the
protections of the Bill of Attainder Clause are applicable to corporations. It ultimately
concludes that the Clause is not applicable to the corporate entity based on history,
precedent, and differences in injury and regulation between the natural person and the
corporate entity as well concerns regarding foreign relations and Congress’ duties to
regulate and respond to sensitive foreign policy issues.
This Article proceeds in the following manner: Part I introduces the situation with
Huawei Technologies (“Huawei”), the events leading up to the indictments against
Huawei and some of its officers, as well as the subsequent complaint and motion for
summary judgment filed by Huawei against the U.S. government, which was later
denied. Part I closes with a brief summary of the Bill of Attainder Clause, the status
of corporate bill of attainder claims in the courts, and commentaries within the
academic community, all of which largely assume that corporate bill of attainder
claims are permissible.
Part II analyzes the opinion from the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison v.
Pataki. This opinion is significant because it is the first decision to find a violation of
the Bill of Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity. Part III presents the main
argument of this article, namely that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects only personal
dignitary interests. This Part criticizes the two holdings of Consolidated Edison as
erroneous by failing to consider history and precedent as well as incomplete by
declining to discuss how corporate injury and regulation are distinct from that of a
natural person. First, it discusses how the history of the Clause and Supreme Court
decisions—which have all found violations of the Clause only with respect to
individuals—both support an individualized approach. Second, it demonstrates how
*Alina Veneziano, Ph.D. Candidate, King’s College London; LL.M., New York University School of
Law, 2019; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2018; M.B.A., Western Governors University; B.S.,
Accounting, Western Governors University. Alina Veneziano is a registered attorney of the Bar of the State of
New York. She is grateful to the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their incredible edits throughout the
publication process. She thanks her family for their love and support.
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”)
2
This article does not delve into analyses of punitive intent versus non-punitive regulation and instead
presumes punitive intent in the 2019 NDAA in light of the Huawei case. This article investigates the initial
and most pressing issue of whether the Bill of Attainder Clause is properly applicable to the corporate entity.
3
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv159-ALM (E.D. Tex., Feb. 18, 2020).
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the inherent differences between the natural person and the corporation—such as
injuries sustainable and state and federal regulation—prevent comparable treatment
regarding bill of attainder claims.
Part IV offers a subsidiary argument that supports the conclusion that the Bill of
Attainder Clause is not applicable to corporations. This argument contends that
Congress must retain the flexibility needed to respond to foreign security issues.
Therefore, Congress’ ability to sanction, regulate foreign commerce, and respond to
sensitive foreign policy issues must not be hindered. Part IV concludes that extending
the protections of the Bill of Attainder Clause to the corporate entity would complicate
these purposes. Part V reiterates the conclusion that this Article promotes: that the
personal dignitary interests protected by the Clause and Congress’ duty to defend
national security interests and respond to foreign policy issues mandate that the Bill of
Attainder Clause not extend to corporations.
B.

THE INDICTMENTS AND THE COMPLAINT

In 2019, two indictments were returned against Huawei, charging it with theft of
trade secrets conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to defraud the United
States, among other charges.4 Huawei filed its complaint in March 2019 in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and subsequently a motion for summary
judgment in May 2019.5 Huawei’s claim argues that Section 889 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) of 2019, which prohibits the use of Huawei
equipment and certain telecommunications services by U.S. government agencies, is
unconstitutional.6 Specifically, Huawei relies on three arguments to support its
position that Section 889 of the 2019 NDAA is unconstitutional.
First, as its main argument, Huawei argues that the Act violates the Bill of
Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution by targeting it for punishment.7 Second,
Huawei contends that the Act violates due process of law by severely curtailing its
ability to do business and by branding it a tool of the Chinese government.8 Lastly,
Huawei asserts that Section 889 violates the Constitution’s vesting clause and
separation of powers by legislatively adjudicating Huawei as guilty rather than leaving
this issue to either the Executive or the Judiciary.9

4
See Indictment, United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., No. 2:19-cr-00010-RSM (W.D.
Wash., Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1124996/download; see also Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Cr. No. 18-457 (S-2) (AMD) (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 24,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1125021/download.
5
See Complaint, Huawei Technologies USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv-00159
(E.D. Tex. 2019), https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/huawei.pdf?mod=article_inline; see
also Motion for Summary Judgment, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv-159-ALM
(E.D. Tex., May 28, 2019), https://games-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/a06cf0eed366-41f9-8ead-147f6a0513bb/note/04dd5695-718f-45fd-9eb8-a94ab8c6bc03.pdf#page=1.
6
See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §
889, 132 Stat. 1636, 1917 (2019).
7
See Complaint, Huawei, No. 4:19-cv-00159, at *3.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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In February 2020, the district court judge denied Huawei’s motion for summary
judgment. Nevertheless, the issue of the Bill of Attainder Clause’s applicability
remains a critical topic for debate.
C.

THE U.S. BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE

This article examines the crux of Huawei’s argument: the alleged violation of the
Bill of Attainder Clause.10 Huawei’s claim raised the question of whether the Bill of
Attainder Clause applies to corporations in the first place. Article I, Section 9 reads as
follows: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”11 The text of the
Clause does not mention “person” or “individual,” nor does it reference any intended
recipient of its protections against attainder.12 Because the text of the Clause is of no
avail, Supreme Court precedent must be consulted. But here, too, the Supreme Court
has never ruled on the applicability of the Bill of Attainder Clause to corporations.13
With the exception of one opinion from the Second Circuit, the circuit courts have not
found a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity.
Instead, these lower courts—excluding the Second Circuit—have largely assumed that
the Clause is applicable to the corporate entity,14 though have ruled against the
corporate plaintiff on other grounds.15 Additionally, scholarship from the academic
10
This article examines the threshold question of whether the U.S. Bill of Attainder Clause is applicable
to corporations such as Huawei. Huawei’s additional claims asserting violations of the Due Process and
Vesting Clauses are not the subject of this article and are only indirectly addressed.
11
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (There is also an equivalent prohibition for states in U.S. Const. art. I, § 10:
“No State shall . . . pass any bill of attainder.”)
12
Id.
13
See SBC Communications v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the Court has
yet to reach th[is] question directly”).
14
Opinions and briefs pay scant attention to the question of whether the Bill of Attainder Clause applies
to corporations and largely presume that it is applicable to the corporate entity. See Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v.
United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 909 F.3d 446, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that the D.C.
Circuit has “previously assumed without deciding” the Clause’s applicability to corporations and because the
government did not argue that the Clause only protects individuals and because there are no arguments to the
contrary, “we shall continue to assume that the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to corporations”); see also
ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court
has never had occasion to rule on the issue,” the Second Circuit has previously held that the scope of the
clause includes corporations); see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir.
2002) (noting that the “applicability of the Bill of Attainder Clause to corporations remains unsettled in every
circuit” but because the Supreme Court has intimidated at its extension without discussion and because several
Courts of Appeals “have expressly assumed [it] without deciding that the Clause is applicable to
corporations,” the court noted that the Bill of Attainder clause “is one of the constitutional rights enjoyed by
corporations.”); see also BellSouth Corp. v. FCC (“BellSouth II”), 162 F.3d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting
that, as in BellSouth I, both parties assume that the Clause protects corporations and individuals and that “we
make the same assumption here”); see also BellSouth Corp. v. FCC ("BellSouth I"), 144 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (stating that “[it] assume[s], as do the parties, that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects corporations
as well as individuals” and noting that the “clause’s coverage clearly seems to include at least closely held
corporations, where an attainder would fall on a narrowly circumscribed, easily identified group of flesh-andblood people,” but “[g]iven the parties’ shared assumption, we will not explore the issue further”); see also
SBC Communications, 154 F.3d 234 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)(observing that even if it is assumed that the Bill of
Attainder applies to corporations, the claimant’s argument fails but acknowledging that the answer to this issue
“does seem likely”).
15
These decisions generally rule against the plaintiff on other reasons, obviating any need to decide
whether the Clause applies to corporations. See Kaspersky, 909 F.3d at 460 (holding the provision was not a
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community reflects the common consensus that the Bill of Attainder Clause does apply
to corporations.16 Thus, the Second Circuit stands as a notable exception on this issue
and is the subject of the next section.
II.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN CONSOLIDATED EDISON V. PATAKI
A.

FACTS

In 2002, the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison Company of New York v.
Pataki17 became the only court to find a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in
favor of the corporate entity.18 Consolidated Edison Company (“Con Edison”)—a
provider of electrical power to New York City—experienced a power outage from a
defective generator, of which it was aware.19 The New York legislature passed a law
in response to the power outage at one of Con Edison's power plants.20 Among some
of the key provisions in the law were legislative findings that all operators of nuclear
facilities have “a high duty of care to protect the health, safety and economic interests
of its customers” and that by continuing to operate steam generators known to be
defective and therefore increasing the risk of radioactive release, “Consolidated Edison
Company failed to exercise reasonable care on behalf of the health, safety and
bill of attainder violation “given the reasonable balance between the burden imposed by section 1634 and the
nonpunitive national security objective it furthers”); see also ACORN, 618 F.3d at 142 (holding that the
“statements by a handful of
legislators are insufficient to establish—by themselves—the clearest proof of punitive intent necessary
for a bill of attainder”); see also BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 680 (holding that the provision is not a bill of
attainder “because it does not inflict ‘punishment’ on BellSouth”); see also BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67
(holding that the “distinction drawn by Congress seems quite understandable without resort to inferences of
punitive purpose,” precluding a finding of a bill of attainder violation); see also SBC Communications, 154
F.3d at 242–44 (holding that there was no bill of attainder violation since the provision was not punitive
“because they do not impose a perpetual bar,” “because they serve a nonpunitive purpose: attempting to ensure
fair competition in the markets,” “because neither their terms nor their legislative history demonstrates the
‘smoking gun’ evidence of punitive intent,” and “because they were part of a larger quid pro quo”
representative of a “compromise on a massive issue of public policy”). See infra, Part III.D. for an elaboration
of the facts and holdings of these opinions.
16
See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 112
(2014) (observing that even though a corporation is created by law, it operates to accomplish important goals
of individuals and furthers the public good); see also Karey P. Pond, Constitutional Law – The
Telecommunications Act of 1996: When Legislative Regulation Becomes Unconstitutional Punishment, 22 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 309 (2000) (noting that because the Bill of Attainder Clause acts as a safeguard
against legislative determinations of guilt and because corporations are subject to criminal law, “it is only
natural that the prohibition against legislative punishments be applicable to corporations”); see also Thomas
Lee, Constitutional Law-Bill of Attainder-Fifth Circuit Holds That the Special Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Are Not a Bill of Attainder, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (1999)
(promoting an approach that would extend the Bill of Attainder Clause only to “protect political minorities
from targeted punishment by majoritarian legislatures” but that the Clause should not protect corporations
“from particularized economic legislation”); see also JOHN T. MULLIGAN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 7 (1913)
(contending that a corporation is merely “a collection of many individuals, united into one body . . . with
capacity of acting in many respects as an individual”).
17
See generally Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002).
18
Id. at 355.
19
Id. at 343-44.
20
Id. at 343.
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economic interests of its customers.”21 It continued by declaring that “it would not be
in the public interest for the company to recover from ratepayers any costs” relating to
the power outage.22 Specifically, “the New York state public service commission shall
prohibit the Consolidated Edison Company from recovering from its ratepayers any
costs associated with replacing the power from such facility.”23
Con Edison brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of
New York, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief barring enforcement
of the statute based on violations of the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I, Section
10,24 amongst other claims.25 The District Court held that the New York legislature
passed a Bill of Attainder because “the legislature took it upon itself to determine the
[Con Edison’s] guilt and to impose the sanction it deemed appropriate,” which
demonstrated the legislative intent to punish.26 The Second Circuit affirmed.27
The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s definition of a bill of attainder
as set forth in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.28 The Court in Nixon stated
that a statute can be a bill of attainder only if: (1) it “determines guilt and inflicts
punishment,” (2) “upon an identifiable individual,” and (3) “without provision of the
protections of a judicial trial.”29 The Circuit immediately concluded that factor (3)—
no protections of a judicial trial—is “incontrovertible” in that the bill was passed using
the legislative process without the protections of a judicial trial.30 Thus, only two
factors were at issue for the Second Circuit: whether Con Edison is “an ‘individual’
that may invoke the protection of the Clause” and whether the legislative provision
“determines guilt” and “inflicts punishment.”31 The Second Circuit answered both
questions in the affirmative.
B.

FIRST HOLDING: CORPORATIONS ARE INDIVIDUALS FOR
BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAIMS

The Second Circuit analyzed the Clause’s applicability to corporations as
individuals first. After listing which constitutional rights are applicable and
inapplicable to corporations, it noted that the Supreme Court had reasoned that the
distinction between rights that can be asserted by corporations and those that cannot is
because “certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and
other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been
21

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
24
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
25
See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 345 (These other claims raised by Con Edison included violations of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supremacy Clause, and the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10. But because this article
is focused solely on the connection—if any—between the Bill of Attainder Clause(s) and corporations, the
analysis of Con Edison is limited to the Bill of Attainder claim.)
26
See Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pataki, 117 F. Supp.2d 257, 265–71 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
27
See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 345.
28
See generally Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
29
See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 346 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468).
30
See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 346.
31
Id.
22
23
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limited to the protection of individuals” and that whether the right is personal depends
on its “nature, history, and purpose.”32
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the applicability of the Clause to
corporations “remains unsettled in every circuit” but observed subtle and brief
indications from the Supreme Court that could indicate corporate applicability.33 For
instance, in United States v. Lovett, the Supreme Court alluded to this possibility by
stating that “legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution.”34 Additionally, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, the Court indicated, in
dicta, that the Clause may target a “single individual or firm.”35 Further, in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court stated that the Clause gives “protections
for individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to
nonjudicial determinations of guilt.”36 The Second Circuit immediately foreclosed the
issue that there could be a difference between corporations and private groups by
reasoning that the mere reference to private groups by the Court in Katzenbach
“plainly contemplates protection for some entities in addition to individual natural
persons.”37 Because of these indications, the court concluded that the Clause is not a
“purely personal” guarantee and is, therefore, “one of the constitutional rights enjoyed
by corporations.”38
In making this conclusion, the Second Circuit contended that the “historical
function” of the Clause has been to safeguard the “procedural protections of the
judicial process” and is, therefore, associated with the “right to procedural due
process.”39 It also contended that cases where the Supreme Court refused to apply
constitutional rights to corporations involved “competing state interests in regulating
corporate conduct and investigating corporate wrongdoing,” thus mandating some
degree of “transparency.”40 For instance, the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. United
States, refused to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
corporations based on the “visitatorial power”41 that the state retains in the corporation
after incorporation. Also, the Court, in United States v. Morton Salt, determined that
corporations enjoy narrower rights to privacy due to the state’s “legitimate right” in
ensuring corporate behavior comports with “the law and the public interest.”42 But the
Second Circuit distinguished these cases from the one at hand by noting that although
New York has an interest in investigating and regulating the malfeasance of
corporations, “it has no interest in inflicting punishment for such malfeasance on the
corporation's shareholders through the legislative process,” especially where there was
32

Id. at 347 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14 (1978)).
Id, 292 F.3d at 347.
34
Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946)) (emphasis added).
35
Id. at 347 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995)) (emphasis added).
36
Id. at 347 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)) (emphasis added).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 348.
41
Id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382–84 (1911)).
42
Id. (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)).
33
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an existing administrative procedure to follow to vindicate the alleged wrongdoing
such as the “prudence review process.”43
C.

SECOND HOLDING: THE PROVISION DETERMINES GUILT AND
INFLICTS PUNISHMENT

Turning next to “guilt,” the Second Circuit noted that in order to find a violation
of the Bill of Attainder Clause, the provision must have a “retrospective focus”—
meaning it must “define[] past conduct as wrongdoing and then impose[] punishment
on that past conduct.”44 The Circuit had no problem concluding that the New York
legislature considered Con Edison guilty, as evidenced by the statute’s focus on
“conduct related to a single, past incident . . . as the basis for the sanction it imposes.”45
Regarding the court’s analysis of “punishment,” it went through the three factors
articulated by the Supreme Court in Nixon to determine if the provision was punitive:
“(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative
punishment; (2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of
burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’;
and (3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a [legislative] intent to punish.’”46
For the traditional or historical factor, the Second Circuit listed examples of
punitive per se punishments such as “imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive
confiscation of property . . . [and] a legislative enactment barring designated
individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations.”47
The court determined that the only traditional punishment implicated here is the
“punitive confiscation of property” because the provision “clearly deprived Con Ed of
a property interest” of “approximately $250 million that it would otherwise have been
able to obtain from its customers.”48 However, the court noted that the “deprivation”
here is not the same as a “confiscation,” so it instead did “not decide whether [the
provision] imposes a traditional attainder.”49 Regarding the functional factor, the
Second Circuit noted several nonpunitive purposes, such as “prevent[ing] Con Ed’s
ratepayers from being forced to bear costs that the legislature viewed as negligently
incurred,” “deter[ring] similar conduct by Con Ed and other public utilities in the
future,” regulating monopolies which “do[] not face the same incentives to minimize
costs as does an actor in a competitive market,” and “deter[ring] negligent conduct
with an eye toward protecting public health.”50 However, the court noted that the “type
and severity of burdens imposed”51 by this provision “leads us to a different
conclusion.”52 Because “it is undisputed that Con Ed would have been allowed to pass
43

Id.
Id. at 349. See also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73.
45
See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 349.
46
Id. at 350 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475–76, 478).
47
Id. at 351 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473–74).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 351–52.
51
Id. at 352 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475).
52
Id. at 353.
44
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through to ratepayers the costs of covering power demand while replacing the
generators during a scheduled outage,” the court concluded that nothing “other than
punishment can justify forcing Con Ed to absorb those same costs after the accidental
outage.”53 Further, because there were alternatives available that did not include
forcing Con Edison to absorb all costs, “the legislature piled on a burden that was
obviously disproportionate to the harm caused,” and therefore, punitive intent was
clearly demonstrated.54 Lastly, the court observed several instances of a legislative
intent to punish under the motivational factor, such as statements by legislators.
Examples include “Con Edison has done a terrible thing” or that Con Edison “should
certainly be penalized.”55 Therefore, the provision was a “punitive” measure.56
D.

CONCLUSION

Thus, a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause was affirmed in favor of Con
Edison, making this holding from the Second Circuit the first time a judicial opinion
has found a violation of the Clause in favor of the corporate entity.57 There have been
no further decisions by the appellate courts, or any other court, that have found a
violation of the Clause for corporations.
In summary, the Second Circuit in Con Edison upheld the violation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity based on two reasonings: first, by
holding that the Clause was applicable to corporations and, second, by holding that the
provision at issue demonstrated the requisite retroactive imposition of guilt and
punishment required to find a bill of attainder. Its first holding determined that the
intended recipients of the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to corporations. Its second
holding reasoned that the congressional intent by the New York legislature in the
statutory provision that forced Con Edison to absorb the costs of the power outage it
caused was a bill of attainder. Sections A and B of Part III of this article set forth
arguments as to why the first holding of Con Edison is clearly erroneous. Sections C
and D of Part III demonstrate how the second holding of Con Edison is an incomplete
analysis of this issue. Part IV then presents an alternative argument as to why corporate
extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause is a hazardous decision.

53

Id.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355–56.
56
Id. at 355.
57
Id. at 356.
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III. THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE PROTECTS ONLY PERSONAL DIGNITARY
INTERESTS
A.

THE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE
DEMONSTRATES AN INDIVIDUAL-BASED STANDPOINT

English law, early commentaries, the Revolutionary era, and the U.S. Founding
Fathers have all understood attainder as a tool used against natural persons. First,
beginning in the sixteenth century, the English monarchy used attainder to execute
individuals who had been disloyal to the Crown.58 Second, commentaries by jurists,
such as William Blackstone, have described attainder as a “sentence of death.”59
Blackstone asserted that an aggregate corporation “is not liable . . . to attainder” for
“[i]t cannot be executor or administrator, or perform any personal duties . . . for it
cannot take an oath . . . cannot be seized of lands . . . for such kind of confidence is
foreign to the ends of its institution.”60 Additionally, Justice Joseph Story defined
attainder as a form of “capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high
offences . . . without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”61
Third, attainder had been used by the thirteen colonies during the Revolutionary War
to confiscate the estates of Tories who had remained loyal to England.62 Lastly, the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution—having understood attainder from English law as
“parliamentary acts sentencing named persons to death without the benefit of a judicial
trial”63—saw its use as “dangerous” and capable of turning the liberty of free people
and government into a “mockery of common sense.”64 They sought to prevent
attainder in the new American nation, and the records of the Federal Convention reveal
that the prohibition on bills of attainder in the U.S. Constitution was agreed to
unanimously.65
This desire by the Founding Fathers to prevent bills of attainder in U.S.
jurisprudence demonstrates a focus on protecting the individual from the original
consequences of attainder.
The Second Circuit, in Consolidated Edison,
acknowledged the same in its opinion by quoting Supreme Court dicta, in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which stated that whether a right is personal
58
See Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James the Second
Passim (The Aldine Press, 1848) (discussing early instances of attainer within the history of England such as
the attainder of Cromwell during the reign of Henry VIII, the attainder of the late King Richard III, and the act
of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament of James II).
59
See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) (reprinted in Founders’
Constitution, William Blackstone, Commentaries 4:373–79, vol. III 343–45 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987)).
60
Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
61
See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 1338–39 (1833) (reprinted
in Founders’ Constitution, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3: §§ 1338-39 1833, vol. III 353–
54 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner ed., 1987)) (emphasis added).
62
See Charles H. Wilson Jr., The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification,
54 CAL. L. REV. 212, 216 (1966).
63
See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 62 (emphasis added).
64
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 444 (1965).
65
See James Madison, Records of the Federal Convention 2:375, in 3 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 347
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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“depends on [its] nature, history, and purpose.”66 Here, the historical meaning of the
term cannot be based on anything other than an individual-based standpoint as a
“purely personal” guarantee.67
B.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FINDING BILL OF ATTAINDER
VIOLATIONS HAVE ALL INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS

On only five occasions has the Supreme Court invalidated laws under the Bill of
Attainder Clause.68 All cases involved the interests of an individual or group of
individuals. Starting in the 1860s, after the Civil War, the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Garland, Cummings v. Missouri and the companion case Pierce v. Carskadon,
invalidated provisions requiring individuals take loyalty oaths prior to employment
asserting that they never supported the Confederate Government.69 In Ex parte
Garland and Pierce, the federal law requiring this oath was directed at “every person
elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United
States.”70 The provision in the state constitution requiring the oath in Cummings was
directed at anyone seeking a professional license and extended to “every person
holding . . . any of the offices.”71
About a century later, the Supreme Court found violations of the Bill of Attainder
Clause in United States v. Lovett72 and United States v. Brown,73 decided in 1946 and
1965, respectively. In Lovett, a special subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee had determined that Watson, Dodd, and Lovett—government workers—
were charged with engaging in “subversive activity” and were therefore not entitled to
payment for their federal work.74 The Supreme Court held the provision “was designed
to apply to particular individuals” and operated “‘as a legislative decree of perpetual
exclusion’ from a chosen vocation.”75 About two decades later, the Supreme Court in
Brown invalidated a section of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
as a bill of attainder.76 That Section “conditioned a union’s access to the National
Labor Relations Board upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union’s officers
attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party.”77
Brown—an “open and avowed Communist”—had been elected to the Executive Board
and was subsequently charged with violating this Section.78 The Court noted that the
66

See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 347 (2002) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 778-79 n.14 (1978)).
67
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701 (1944)).
68
See Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. 234
(1872); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
69
See generally Cummings, 71 U.S. at 277; see also generally Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 333; see also
companion case Pierce, 83 U.S. at 234.
70
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added); see also Pierce, 83 U.S. at 239.
71
See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 317.
72
See generally Lovett, 328 U.S. at 303.
73
See generally Brown, 381 U.S. at 437.
74
See Lovett, 328 U.S at 305, 310–11.
75
Id. at 316 (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 377).
76
See Brown, 381 U.S. at 438–40.
77
Id. at 439.
78
Id. at 440.
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Clause ought to be “read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar,” the evil of
which is “legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated
persons or groups.”79 In finding a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in Brown,
the Supreme Court held that the provision “designates in no uncertain terms the
persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office
without incurring criminal liability.”80
Thus, all five cases where the Supreme Court has found a violation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause involved an individual or group of individuals—whether named or
clearly ascertainable. Specifically, the provisions struck as bills of attainder in these
cases “stigmatized [the claimant’s] reputation and seriously impaired their chance to
earn a living.”81 However, corporations do not “earn a living;” instead, the creation of
a corporation is “necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public,” to carry out
those rights of the public by maintaining perpetual succession as “artificial persons,”
as Blackstone had stated.82
The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison, however, relied on language from
Supreme Court opinions, such as the Court’s reference in Katzenbach to “individual
persons and private groups,”83 to conclude that the Supreme Court must have
contemplated protections under the Clause in addition to individual natural persons.84
But the Second Circuit failed to explain how this reference to “groups” automatically
includes the corporate entity. It also failed to explain why “groups” does not include
anything other than the corporate entity. To the contrary, the language in Supreme
Court decisions dealing with “groups” are really about individuals who are part of an
ascertainable group.
In American Communications Association v. Douds, the Supreme Court, in a
plurality decision in 1950, described the prior decisions that had found violations of
the Clause as involving “the proscription of certain occupations to a group classified
according to belief and loyalty.”85 The claimant in Douds was a union.86 The Court
noted that the provision in Douds prohibiting “members of those groups identified in
[the provision]” from serving as union leaders unless they “renounce the[ir]
allegiances” was enacted to protect the public from Communism.87 Additionally, in
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,88 the
Supreme Court defined attainder as the singling out of an individual for punishment
“whether the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which,
79

Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 314.
82
See Blackstone, supra note 59, at 464 (William Blackstone had also written on the differences between
the natural person and the corporate entity. It is interesting that Blackstone placed the chapter “Of
Corporations” under the First Book titled “of the Rights of Persons” as opposed to the Second Book titled “of
the Rights of Things.” But he then goes on to qualify this classification by noting that corporations were
created to carry on the rights of people—rights that people cannot accomplish because they are mortal).
83
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
84
See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 347.
85
See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950) (referring to the Court’s earlier
holdings in Lovett, Ex parte Garland, and Cummings).
86
Id. at 387.
87
Id. at 414.
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See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons.”89
Thus, the “terms of conduct” denotes the characteristics of the group and leads to the
“designation of particular persons” within that group. Further, in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, the Supreme Court recounted prior Supreme Court
decisions finding violations of the Clause for both (1) individuals, such as United
States v. Lovett,90 which barred named individuals from government employment and
(2) groups, such as United States v. Brown91 and Cummings v. Missouri,92 which barred
Communist Party members from offices in labor unions and clergymen from ministry
without taking a loyalty oath, respectively.93 Therefore, more often than not, history
shows that the claimants asserting bill of attainder claims have been individuals as
members of groups. None have compared the corporate entity to a “group.”
Instead, the corporation is more comparable to the duties and characteristics of a
state. For instance, even though the Second Circuit relied on the language in
Katzenbach regarding “individual persons and private groups,”94 the Court in
Katzenbach also observed some limits of the term person. It cautioned that the word
“person” cannot be expanded to include states, as the state “does [not] have standing
as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal
Government.”95 This suggests a special status vested in states as distinct from
“individual persons and private groups”—something that can be compared to
corporations.96
Without more, however, the Second Circuit was simply in error to conclude that
Katzenbach’s reference to “private groups” “plainly contemplates protection for some
entities in addition to individual natural persons,”97 especially in light of Supreme
Court decisions describing groups. The more logical reasoning is that the term
“group”—as interpreted in dicta by the Supreme Court—only refers to individuals as
a part of a collection of persons, such as federal court officers,98 medical
professionals,99 convicted felons,100 members of the Communist Party,101 labor
unions,102 clergy members,103 or even males,104 as some examples. Thus, this
89

Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
See generally Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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See generally Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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See generally Cummings, 71 U.S. 277 (1867).
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See Nixon, 433 U.S. 425, 473–74 (1977).
94
See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 347 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)).
95
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24 (referring to the Bill of Attainder Clause, amongst some of these
protections that the state does not have standing to assert against the government).
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See discussion infra Part III.C. (on the treatment given to corporations under defamation law), Part
III.D. (of the corporation’s limited privacy rights due to interests in state and federal regulation of
corporations).
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See Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 347.
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See generally Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
99
See generally Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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See generally Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
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See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603 (1960).
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See generally Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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See generally Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
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demonstrates that the Court’s references to “groups” describe ascertainable, specified
persons.105 Because a corporation is not a “group” in this respect—as the Second
Circuit had determined—the Bill of Attainder Clause cannot apply to corporations
based on this reasoning, and the Second Circuit was in error to do so.
C.

CORPORATIONS—AS BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS—CAN
ONLY SUSTAIN ECONOMIC INJURIES IN DEFAMATION
CASES, NOT INJURIES TO PERSONAL DIGNITY

A corporation does not possess personal dignitary interests and, while they can
sue for defamation, the only cognizable injury a corporation can suffer is injury to its
economic and business interests. The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Pataki failed to account for or even discuss the inherent differences between a natural
person and a corporation.106 These differences in types of sufferable injuries bear
reconciliation. Section C discusses corporate defamation and, consequently, the
injuries a corporation can sustain.
With respect to corporations, William L. Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts
notes that “[a] corporation is regarded as having no reputation in any personal sense,
so that it cannot be defamed by words.”107 Nevertheless, it has the “prestige and
standing in the business in which it is engaged” such that language that affects its
character may be actionable.108 Further, the Restatement (Third) of Torts defines
defamation of a corporation as the publication of a statement that “tends to prejudice
[the corporation] in the conduct of its trade or business or to deter third persons from
dealing with it.”109
New York Times v. Sullivan is the seminal Supreme Court case establishing the
standard for defamation plaintiffs.110 In Sullivan, decided in 1964, an elected official
sued for libel in connection with an advertisement in defendant’s newspaper.111 The
Court held that public officials may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
unless he or she proves that the statement was made with “actual malice.”112 In the
consolidated cases Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, the
105
As an example of a recent circuit case from the D.C. Circuit that found a violation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause in favor of a natural person based on a marred reputation, see Foretich v. United States, 351
F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Act at issue in Foretich allowed the daughter to choose whether she wanted
to see her father, whom her mother had accused of sexually abusing the child over the father’s repeated and
vehement denials. Id. at 1224. The D.C. Circuit, in invalidating this provision, held that a violation of the Bill
of Attainder Clause will be found where there is an “extraordinary imbalance between the burden imposed and
the alleged nonpunitive purpose” and if it appears that the provision does not support the alleged purpose of
Congress, and if the legislative means do not appear rationally to further that alleged purpose.” Id. at 1223.
The D.C. Circuit also asserted that the violation of the Clause imposed upon the father the “opprobrium of
being branded” with a serious offense and “inflict[ed] significant and costly injury to [his] reputation.” Id. at
1220, 1223.
106
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002).
107
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 745 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
108
Id.
109
See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 561 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
110
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Id. at 256.
112
Id. at 279–80.
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Court extended the standard to “public figures.”113 The Court, in a plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, held that the Sullivan standard even applies to a private
person if the defamatory statement concerned a “subject of public or general
interest.”114 However, three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme
Court drew two distinctions between public figures and private individuals.115 First,
public officials and public figures can better “counteract false statements,” compared
to individuals who are “therefore more vulnerable to injury.”116 Second, those
involved in “public affairs” inevitably “run[] the risk of closer public scrutiny.”117 The
Court’s distinction between the types of claimants is based on differences in status and
power.
The Supreme Court has not specified whether nor to what extent the “public
figure” as per Gertz or “public interest” as per Rosenbloom standard is applicable to
corporations in corporate defamation cases. Therefore, it has been the lower courts
that have tried to flesh out the connection between corporate defamation suits and
standards of proof. Lower courts have used either the Rosenbloom or Gertz standard
with corporate plaintiffs in defamation cases. As an example of the former, the D.C.
District Court in Martin Marietta v. Evening Star Newspaper followed Rosenbloom’s
“public interest” test and held that a corporate claimant in a defamation suit must prove
that the statement was made with actual malice whenever the statement involves
“matters of legitimate public interest.”118 It noted that when individuals assume
positions of public importance, “they sacrifice their private lives.”119 Corporations, on
the other hand, do not have private lives to begin with and, consequently, must be
denied full protection from libel.120 The corporate entity “never has a private life to
lose.”121 Thus, the interests the Court in Gertz sought to protect, on the other hand,
were those of “a highly personal nature” and not those associated with corporate
activity.122 As an example of a lower court utilizing Gertz’s “public figure” test for
the corporate plaintiff, the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's held that the corporate plaintiff was a public figure
because it was a “large corporation with more than a billion dollars in assets,” there
had been “great public interest” in its activities in recent years, and its “shares [were]
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.”123 Therefore, its industry was “a field
subject to close state regulation.”124 Thus, because the corporate plaintiff had assumed
the “prominence in the affairs of society,” it had to prove actual malice.125
113

See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130

(1967).

114

See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plurality opinion).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
116
Id. at 344.
117
Id.
118
See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956 (D.D.C. 1976).
119
Id. at 955.
120
Id.
121
Id. (emphasis added).
122
Id.
123
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (corporate claimant was
in the insurance industry).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1347, 1350 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
115

Journal of Legislation

293

Nevertheless, even if the standard under defamation law for the corporation can
be analogized to the individual, the injury cannot be. Again, it has been the lower
courts that have articulated the “injury” of a corporation in defamation suits and the
damages available. For instance, the D.C. District Court noted that corporate
defamation occurs “only by imputation about its financial soundness or business
ethics.”126 It may only recover actual damages in the form of lost profits.127 This
difference in corporate treatment reflects something logically and factually distinct
from the defamation of a natural person. Consequently, the D.C. District Court in
Martin Marietta noted that a corporate libel action is not “a basic of our constitutional
system.”128 The D.C. Circuit has also been vocal on its stance as to the difference
between corporate and individual reputation.129 It recently acknowledged that the
“brand of infamy or disloyalty” is most applicable to “flesh-and-blood humans,” even
though corporations may derive substantial financial value from their products’
reputation.130 To a corporation, the D.C. Circuit noted, reputation is an “asset” to be
“cultivate[d], manage[d], and monetize[d]”131 Therefore, when dealing with the scope
of a constitutional guarantee, any analogy between situations where the claimant is an
individual to one where the claimant is a corporation “must necessarily take into
account this difference.”132
In Con Edison, both Con Edison and the Second Circuit conceded that Con Edison
lost money in being unable to pass the costs on to its ratepayers. In fact, the court
determined that the provision “clearly deprived Con Ed of a property interest” that cost
the corporation “approximately $250 million that it would otherwise have been able to
obtain from its customers.”133 Because Con Edison could not pass these costs on to its
customers, it had to internalize the increased costs of about $ 250 million.134 In other
words, Con Edison had to absorb the costs itself and hence suffered an injury of $250
million, which led the corporation to file suit in the District Court for the Northern
District of New York.135 Therefore, this injury in the form of financial loss cannot be
equated to a dignitary harm that “stigmatize[s] [its] reputation,” as Supreme Court
language has dictated.136
Thus, consensus within the Supreme Court and the lower courts has long reflected
the several distinctions between the corporate versus individual status and also
between the corporate versus individual recovery in defamation suits. And although
injury to the economic interests of a corporation may be actionable via defamation law,
it cannot be maintained under the Bill of Attainder Clause because corporations cannot
suffer personal, dignitary interests. For instance, the Second Circuit admitted that Con
126
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Edison’s monetary loss could not be maintained under Nixon’s traditional or historical
punishment factor.137 It is further unlikely that such injury could be found under either
Nixon’s functional or motivational factors. Thus, corporate “injury” in terms of
financial loss is not comparable to the individual “punishment” that the Bill of
Attainder Clause seeks to guard against. Therefore, the failure of the Second Circuit
to clarify how the only injury Con Edison sustained—in the form of financial losses—
is comparable to the type of punishment prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.
D.

BECAUSE CORPORATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO STATE AND
FEDERAL REGULATION, THE PROTECTIONS OF THE BILL OF
ATTAINDER CLAUSE TO THE CORPORATE ENTITY IS NOT
REASONABLE

Corporations possess specialized privileges due to their corporate status that
mandate a certain degree of regulation from state and federal regulatory bodies. The
legitimate state and federal interests in regulating corporate conduct require that the
corporation have less privacy rights than a natural person. Extension of the Bill of
Attainder Clause to the corporation would not advance those interests and would be
unreasonable. This Section discusses the implications, first, of state regulation of
corporations and, second, of federal regulation of corporations. It then discusses the
effects of state and federal regulation upon the corporation’s rights, such as privacy.
First, a corporation is limited by the powers granted to it in its charter and by the
right of the state of its incorporation to regulate it. In 1819, the Supreme Court
described a corporation as an “artificial being . . . existing only in contemplation of
law” and “possess[ing] only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”138 In 1950, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co. stated that “law-enforcing agencies have a
legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law
and the public interest.”139 Thus, privacy rights differ substantially. The Court in
Morton Salt further noted that corporations are not equal with individuals in the
enjoyment of a right to privacy because corporations are “endowed with public
attributes . . . have a collective impact upon society . . . derive the privilege of acting
as artificial entities,” and are allowed to “engag[e] in interstate commerce.”140 And, as
the Court reasoned, with these “[f]avors” from the government come “an enhanced
measure of regulation.”141
The Second Circuit in Con Edison acknowledged this as well, noting that
corporations have been denied constitutional protections by the Supreme Court in
instances where “competing state interests in regulating corporate conduct and
137
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investigating corporate wrongdoing” and “transparency” were at stake.142 The Second
Circuit had even listed several legitimate state purposes in the provision that Con
Edison attacked, such as preventing ratepayers from absorbing the costs, deterring
similar conduct, regulating monopolies, and protecting public health.143 However, it
disregarded these above-listed nonpunitive purposes. Instead, the Second Circuit
distinguished Supreme Court holdings that discussed the state’s retained “visitatorial
power”144 over corporations and the state’s “legitimate right”145 in regulating corporate
behavior by holding that the New York legislature was “inflicting punishment” and
ignoring the administrative process to follow to vindicate the alleged wrongdoing.146
However, language from the Supreme Court indicates that courts are sometimes unable
or unwilling to get involved since to do so would be to interfere with the rights of states
to regulate and investigate corporations in their jurisdiction. The failure of the Second
Circuit in Con Edison to address this fact and reasoning from prior Supreme Court
opinions was erroneous and makes the holding in Con Edison incomplete.
Second, corporations are also subject to federal regulation. A corporation is in a
unique position to use its special corporate privileges to commit unlawful acts. It is
obligatory upon the U.S. government to adopt standards and regulatory measures to
ensure that corporations within U.S. jurisdiction are not abusing their power.
Recognizing this, courts have upheld various legislative provisions against
corporations, even claims asserting violations of the Bill of Attainder Clause because
of Congress’ power to regulate corporations. Excluding the Second Circuit’s opinion
in Consolidated Edison v. Pataki,147 there are six cases from the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals regarding the connection between corporations, bill of attainder
claims, and legislative provisions that allegedly impair the corporation’s business
activities, though to different extents.148 All involve a corporation that had alleged a
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. The remainder of Section D outlines these
decisions, emphasizing the duty of Congress to regulate corporations through
legitimate legislation and the courts’ reflection of that duty in their holdings.
The 2016 Supreme Court case Bank Markazi concerned a congressional provision
that made a particular set of assets available to satisfy the judgments of individuals
who had claims against Iran for its role in supporting state-sponsored terrorism.149 The
Supreme Court held that the provision was “an exercise of congressional authority
regarding foreign affairs, a domain in which the controlling role of the political
branches is both necessary and proper.”150 The bill of attainder claim was therefore
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unsuccessful.151 In addition to this Supreme Court holding, lower courts have also
heard issues of corporate bill of attainder claims and have all based their holdings in
some respect on the legitimate purposes of Congress in enacting the legislative
provision at issue.
Three opinions concerning corporate bill of attainder claims, all decided in 1998,
challenged certain provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The D.C.
Circuit issued two of these opinions, both concerning the same parties but asserting
violations of different provisions of the Telecommunications Act: BellSouth I and
BellSouth II.152 First, in BellSouth I, BellSouth Corporation challenged Section 274 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a bill of attainder because it limited the ability
of its Bell operating companies (“BOCs”) to provide electronic publishing.153 Second,
in BellSouth II, BellSouth Corporation brought another action against the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) claiming that Section 271 prevented them
from providing in-region long distance telephone service without satisfying statutory
criteria.154 The D.C. Circuit held that the provision at issue in BellSouth I represented
a “conventional response to commonly perceived risks of anticompetitive behavior.”155
Further, the provision in BellSouth II was a “rational and nonpunitive congressional
enactment that serves to open telecommunications markets” and to prevent
monopolies, which is “no different than numerous regulatory measures aimed at
particular industries that have never been held to inflict punishment.”156 In addition,
the Fifth Circuit decided in SBC Communications v. FCC that certain provisions of the
Telecommunication Act—which placed restrictions on twenty subsidiaries—were
bills of attainder.157
In 2010, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Acorn Institute, Inc. v. United States
involved a corporation that was legislatively barred from receiving federal funding
after it allegedly engaged in tax evasion, voter fraud, etc., and subsequently alleged
that this provision was a bill of attainder.158 The only reference the Second Circuit
made to Consolidated Edison v. Pataki—also from the Second Circuit—was an
acknowledgment that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule
on the issue, we have held that the scope of the ‘specification of the affected persons’
element includes corporate entities.”159 Nevertheless, there was no violation of the
Clause in Acorn and the Circuit instead determined that the provision was a legitimate
exercise by Congress to carry out its spending powers by “suspend[ing] federal funds
to an organization that has admitted to significant mismanagement”160 The most recent
corporate bill of attainder case was also from the D.C. Circuit—Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v.
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United States Dept. of Homeland Security.161 In 2018, Kaspersky Lab, a Russian-based
corporation, challenged the 2018 NDAA, which banned the use of Kaspersky products
by U.S. governmental agencies.162 The D.C. Circuit in Kaspersky Lab, Inc. upheld the
legislation because Congress had the legitimate purpose of protecting the United States
from the threats of Kaspersky products, making the legislation at issue “prophylactic,
not punitive.”163
Thus, all six holdings noted contained an analysis of Congress’ authority to
regulate the corporate entity based on legitimate, federal regulatory purposes. The
Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison, too, found multiple non-punitive purposes.164
After noting these possible non-punitive purposes, the Second Circuit nevertheless
concluded that nothing “other than punishment” can account for the New York
legislature’s enactment.165 Therefore, the Circuit held that the provision was a “burden
that was obviously disproportionate to the harm caused.”166 But the Second Circuit
failed to distinguish the above cases with the legislative provision at issue in
Consolidated Edison.167 Specifically, the holdings in such cases are all representative
of Congress’ obligation to regulate corporations, carry out its constitutional powers, or
safeguard the nation from national security threats—none of which have found a
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison
was wrong to so easily gloss over and dismiss the legitimate reasons set forth by
Congress for the provision’s enactment without an analysis. Thus, the Circuit’s
cursory analysis was insufficient to justify a finding of punitive intent in Consolidated
Edison.
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES
MANDATE THAT THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE NOT EXTEND TO
CORPORATIONS
Part IV presents an alternative argument as to why the Bill of Attainder Clause
should not extend to corporations. Corporate standing under the Clause would
interfere with national security interests and foreign trade policies in three main
respects: (1) Congress’ ability to sanction; (2) Congress’ power to regulate foreign
commerce and facilitate trade; and (3) the ability of the political branches to respond
swiftly to sensitive foreign policy issues.
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CONGRESS’ ABILITY TO SANCTION

If Huawei could challenge the 2019 NDAA with a corporate bill of attainder claim,
the courts could effectively become the final legislatures at determining when a
corporation ought or ought not to be sanctioned. Such claims asserted by corporations
would hinder the use of sanctions as an effective means of responding to national
security threats against the United States and are more appropriately categorized as
political issues not to be questioned by the Judiciary. Therefore, even if it is contended
that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to corporations, national security interests, like
Congress’ ability to effectively sanction, must be considered by the courts. Neither
the denial of noncontractual benefits nor the severity of the punishment imposed can
affect Congress’ power to sanction. For instance, the Supreme Court in Flemming v.
Nestor noted the provision disqualifying deportees from the receipt of Social Security
benefits while they are not lawfully in this country is a “mere denial of a noncontractual
governmental benefit” with “[n]o affirmative disability or restraint [] imposed.”168
Further, the Supreme Court in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Group had observed that the “severity of a sanction is not determinative of its character
as punishment” when deciding whether the provision at issue violates the Bill of
Attainder Clause.169
There is one case on point with sanctions and corporate bill of attainder claims:
Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security.170 The D.C. Circuit
decided Kaspersky in 2018. In Kaspersky, a section of the 2018 NDAA—enacted by
Congress—banned the use of Kaspersky products by governmental agencies after
concerns that Kaspersky’s ties to Russia were “a threat to the very systems [Kaspersky
products] is meant to protect.”171 The provision prohibiting the use of Kaspersky
products read as follows: “No department, agency, organization, or other element of
the Federal Government may use . . . any hardware, software, or services developed or
provided, in whole or in part, by—(1) Kaspersky Lab . . . .”172 Kaspersky—the
Russian-headquartered cybersecurity corporation—sued alleging a violation of the Bill
of Attainder Clause in the U.S. Constitution.173 The D.C. Circuit began by noting that
the analysis between natural persons and corporations will always be “strained at best”
because there is little precedent on the Clause’s applicability to corporations.174
Nevertheless, the court “assume[d] that the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to
corporations” and thereafter denied relief to Kaspersky because the provision was
“necessary to protect federal computer systems from Russian cyber-threats.”175 The
D.C. Circuit noted that even though “Congress can do more than identify threats
approaching at a distance and wait patiently for those threats to cause empirically
provable consequences,” it was justified in not doing so based on the “magnitude of
168
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the harm” that an intrusion could have upon the United States by compromising its
federal systems.176 Therefore, the legislative provision in Kaspersky imposing the
sanction was a “reasonable and balanced response”177 by Congress based on national
security threats even though alternative measures were available.
Here, continuing with the assumption that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to
corporations, securing and safeguarding the intelligence of the United States from
foreign cybersecurity threats is a legitimate congressional purpose. The judiciary has
no choice but to be convinced that such a provision’s passage was based on legitimate
purposes. Therefore, it would be unreasonable for the judiciary to intervene. Futile
searches into the hidden meaning and subjective intent behind the enactment of Section
889 of the 2019 NDAA is an impermissible endeavor. As the Supreme Court strongly
asserted in Flemming v. Nestor, “[j]udicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at
best a hazardous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective
manifestations it becomes a dubious affair indeed.”178 Here, Congress has set forth
legitimate reasons for the legislation’s passage. Section 889 cites to “the purpose of
public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of
critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.”179 This must be accepted
as sufficient and legitimate by the courts.
B.

CONGRESS’ POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
FACILITATE TRADE

Corporate bill of attainder claims represent an obstacle to congressional action to
address foreign policy issues such as trade law. Should the protections of the Bill of
Attainder Clause extend to corporations, Huawei could effectively challenge
legislation that it feels unfairly disadvantages it. This could, in turn, affect the ability
of the United States to respond to unfair trade practices of other foreign powers such
as China by limiting Congress’ permissible methods—enacting legislation—to assert
pressure campaigns against those foreign powers. In other words, the means utilized
by Congress to deal with the unfair labor and trade practices of China would be
impermissibly curtailed to the point where Congress is no longer able to swiftly react
to foreign relations difficulties. For instance, China has for quite some time utilized a
system of unfair trade practices, which includes “forced technology transfers and
intellectual property theft.”180 Therefore, applying the Bill of Attainder Clause to the
corporate entity would frustrate this purpose and ability of Congress to promptly
respond.
In 2016, the Supreme Court stressed in Bank Markazi v. Peterson that legislation
involving foreign affairs is “a domain in which the controlling role of the political
176
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branches is both necessary and proper.”181 In pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the
political branches have regulated foreign affairs by a variety of means and such
measures have never constituted “invasions upon the Article III judicial power.”182
Therefore, as noted, Congress has the power to legislate against corporations that pose
a threat to the national security and intelligence interests of the United States and it
must do so to effectively respond to foreign threats such as trade law disputes.
C.

THE ABILITY OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES TO RESPOND SWIFTLY TO
SENSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

The Huawei situation both coincides and is a direct consequence of the growing
perceived threat from China. Congress determined that the use of Huawei products by
federal agencies poses a threat to the cybersecurity of the United States and cited to
possible Chinese influence, relying on national security reasons to justify its actions.183
The U.S. government here is focused on the “increasingly authoritarian nature of the
Chinese government” and “the fading line between independent business and the
state.”184 It has already responded to these perceived threats by increasing tariffs on
Chinese goods, imposing investment restrictions, and indicting Chinese nationals
accused of “hacking and cyberespionage.”185 If Huawei could challenge these actions
with a bill of attainder claim and potentially satisfy the Clause’s standards, the security
and intelligence of the United States will be put at risk and, with it, the ability of the
U.S. government to promptly react to sensitive policy issues by these foreign powers.
The Supreme Court has recognized that threats to national security are a legitimate
reason for passing legislation to combat those concerns against the United States. For
instance, in 2010 the Supreme Court was convinced that Congress was justified in
passing the provision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project because Congress had
made “specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international
terrorism.”186 Similarly, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project,
decided seven years later, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]t is ultimately
necessary . . . to balance the equities—to explore the relative harms to applicant and
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respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.”187 This mandates that
Congress’ ability to act suitability and promptly not be hindered. Further, the Supreme
Court in Bank Markazi had also stated that the political branches have a considerable
measure of control over the nation’s foreign relations and have throughout history
exercised such control “as exigencies arose.”188 Any conclusion to the contrary fails
to recognize the importance of remaining abreast of sensitive foreign policy changes
and reacting accordingly.
Thus, based on the above, extending the protections of the Bill of Attainder Clause
to the corporate entity would present severe obstacles with respect to Congress’ ability
to sanction, regulate foreign commerce and trade, and quickly respond to foreign
policy issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Huawei’s chief complaint against the U.S. government alleged violations of the
Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This allegation raises interesting
questions about the applicability of the Clause to corporations. The Supreme Court
has never held that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to corporations and lower courts
have largely assumed it does. With the exception of the Second Circuit, the lower
courts have ruled against the corporate claimant on grounds unrelated to the Clause.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Consolidated Edison stands as a notable exception
on bill of attainder claims brought by corporate claimants. Decided in 2002, the
Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison held not only that corporations are protected
by the Clause to the same extent as individuals, but also that the corporate claimant—
Consolidated Edison—had sufficiently alleged that New York passed a bill of
attainder. Consolidated Edison became the first court to find a violation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity.
The prevailing assumption that the Clause applies to the corporate entity is
unwarranted and bears re-examination. This article has argued that—contrary to the
prevailing assumptions of the courts as well as the literature in the academic
community—the Bill of Attainder Clause is not applicable to corporations. It has made
two arguments: (1) the Bill of Attainder Clause protects only personal dignitary
interests, and (2) national security interests and foreign trade policies mandate that the
Bill of Attainder Clause not extend to corporations.
“Regarding the first argument, this article attacked both holdings of the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Consolidated Edison.” Consolidated Edison’s first holding that
the Clause protects corporations is flawed because the Second Circuit failed to
consider the history of the Clause as well as prior Supreme Court decisions finding
violations of the Clause, all of which have involved individuals. Specifically, the
history of the Clause has revealed an individual-based standpoint rooted in death and
banishment under English law and subsequently outlawed by the Founding Fathers in
the U.S. Constitution to protect the liberty of U.S. society and U.S. government.
187
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Further, all five cases where the Supreme Court has found a violation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause have involved the dignitary interests of an individual and legislation
that impugned the individual’s or group of individuals’ reputation(s) with respect to
their profession. Thus, this history and precedent demonstrate the original intent for
the Clause to be invoked only for the protection of the natural person.
Consolidated Edison’s second holding and analysis that the New York legislature
passed a bill of attainder by targeting Con Edison for punishment is incomplete
because the Second Circuit’s analysis did not consider several distinguishing
characteristics of the corporate entity such as corporate injury and corporate regulation.
In other words, the only injuries a corporation can sustain are economic injuries and,
because corporations are subject to both state and federal regulation, corporate
extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause is unreasonable. Specifically, even though
corporations can sue for defamation, they lack the ability to sustain damages for injury
to their dignitary interests and can only suffer damages in the form of monetary loss.
Further, the act of incorporation mandates that both state and federal regulatory
agencies be involved in the affairs of the corporation, which inevitably requires that
the corporation surrender some of its privacy.
Thus, these distinguishing
characteristics between the natural person and corporate entity lead to the conclusion
that the Bill of Attainder Clause cannot apply to corporations.
Regarding the second subsidiary argument, this article presented an alternative
theory as to why corporate extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause is irrational.
Specifically, it contended that national security interests and foreign trade policies
would negatively impact the United States in three respects: (1) Congress’ ability to
sanction, (2) Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce and facilitate trade, and
(3) the ability of the political branches to respond swiftly to sensitive foreign policy
issues. Specifically, Congress must retain the power to enact legislation and sanction
unhindered by corporate protections under the Bill of Attainder Clause. Congress’
power to regulate foreign commerce cannot be compromised by the ability of
corporations to defeat legitimate legislation. Further, Congress must at all times be
given the flexibility to respond to foreign issues, such as those raised by both Huawei’s
alleged cybersecurity threats as well as China’s trade disputes with the United States.
If Huawei were able to assert a violation of the Clause against the U.S. government,
Congress’ powers to sanction, regulate foreign commerce, and react to foreign policy
issues would be hindered. Thus, corporate extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause
would render the imperative of considering these international issues useless.
In conclusion, the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution only protects
the personal dignitary interests of the individual and corporate extension of the Clause
cannot be maintained due to Congress’ interests in preventing interference with foreign
relations and sensitive foreign policy issues.

